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Abstract
The digital revolution is creating new risks, together with multiple opportunities for communication, 
commerce and political participation. What Ulrich Beck described as the world risk society and – from 
another perspective – Jürgen Habermas calls the “postnational constellation” is a challenge to our 
concepts of society and democracy. Digitisation is pushing this development towards a new dimension 
that allows us to speak of the “digital constellation”. Social relations are denser across borders and 
continents; what happens there matters here, as if it were happening on our own doorstep. New kinds of 
risks are arising as a side-effect of the increasing use of information technologies, while the internet also 
offers – for the first time – an infrastructure that makes formerly unrealistic concepts of cosmopolitan 
democracy (David Held) a real option. This includes the establishment of a constitutional framework 
for normative processes aiming at, among other global challenges, effectively managing cyber-risks at 
national, supra-national and global levels in a coherent way. Multilevel Constitutionalism is proposed as 
a means of providing a normative theory for conceptualising the constitutional structure of a layered 
system of governance that ensures a maximum degree of self-determination for the individual and, 
thus, for the democratic legitimacy of decisions made at each level, from local to global. Thus, the 
constitution for democratically legitimate action at the global level does not question democracy at 
other levels, but should be complementary, based upon functioning states, and designed to deal with 
issues that are beyond their reach, including cyber-security.
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La gestión de riesgos en la constelación digital  
— una perspectiva constitucional (parte I)
Resumen
La revolución digital está creando nuevos riesgos y, a la vez, múltiples oportunidades para la comuni-
cación, el comercio y la participación política. Lo que Ulrich Beck describió como la sociedad mundial 
del riesgo y —desde otra perspectiva— lo que Jürgen Habermas llama la «constelación postnacional» 
es un desafío a nuestros conceptos de sociedad y democracia. La digitalización está impulsando este 
desarrollo hacia una nueva dimensión que nos permite hablar de la «constelación digital». Las relacio-
nes sociales son más densas a través de las fronteras y los continentes; lo que ocurre ahí importa como 
si ocurriera en nuestra propia puerta. Surgen nuevos tipos de riesgos como efecto secundario del uso 
creciente de las tecnologías de la información, mientras que Internet también ofrece — por primera vez 
— una infraestructura que hace de los conceptos hasta ahora poco realistas de democracia cosmopolita 
(David Held) una opción real. Esto incluye el establecimiento de un marco constitucional para los pro-
cesos normativos que trata, entre otros desafíos mundiales, de gestionar de manera coherente y eficaz 
los riesgos cibernéticos a nivel nacional, supranacional y mundial. El constitucionalismo a varios niveles 
se propone como un medio de aportar una teoría normativa para conceptualizar la estructura constitu-
cional de un sistema de gobernanza en capas que garantice el máximo grado de autodeterminación del 
individuo y, por tanto, la legitimidad democrática de las decisiones tomadas en cada nivel, desde lo local 
hasta lo global. Por lo tanto, la constitución para una acción democráticamente legítima a nivel global 
no cuestiona la democracia en otros niveles, sino que debe ser complementaria, basada en estados que 
funcionen y diseñada para tratar temas que están fuera de su alcance, incluyendo la ciberseguridad.
Palabras clave
sociedad del riesgo, democracia, constelación postnacional, digitalización, ciberseguridad, gestión del 
riesgo, constelación digital, ciudadano global, constitucionalismo a varios niveles, soberanía comparti-
da, subsidiariedad, identidades múltiples, constitucionalismo global
Tema 
Derecho, teoría constitucional
Introduction
The digital revolution is a revolution affecting all our 
societies, one which is creating great opportunities and 
great risks. The result is an emerging digital society that 
differs from industrial society in many respects. Talking 
about risk management today necessarily involves 
explaining what the new risks in this digital society are 
before considering the tools and processes to deal with 
these risks, and this seems particularly interesting in a 
constitutional theory and law perspective. 
Some preliminary general questions need to be answered 
nevertheless. First of all, we need to understand what we 
mean by the terms “risk” or “risk society”, and what the 
concept of “Digital Society” denotes. Secondly, managing 
 1.  Habermas (2001, p. 58).
risks is about more than risk assessment, precaution, 
protection or defence, in particular in the digital age. This 
paper takes a broader view and discusses governance 
aspects, as well as political and, in particular, normative 
instruments with the aim of exploring a constitutional 
approach to the choice and implementation of appropriate 
strategies for cyber-risk management.
Here is my first proposition: As we talk about the new 
risks that are being created by digitisation, which, in 
turn, is creating a multitude of opportunities regarding 
governance at large, we have to deal with a new kind of risk 
in a new kind of “constellation”, to use a term coined by 
Jürgen Habermas. Developing his concept of “postnational 
constellation”,1 the internet today is carrying us one step 
further to what I would call the “digital constellation”. This 
will be discussed in the first part of the present paper.
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In the “digital constellation”, we are confronted with new 
risks and threats on a global level, regardless of borders 
and geographical distances. There are great opportunities 
too, offered by the internet for developing new concepts 
of governance that seem to be particularly relevant also 
for risk-management. As has been mentioned in earlier 
studies, digitisation has the particular potential to make 
democratic regulation possible at the global level and also 
to manage risks of the kind involved by the worldwide 
application of ICT.2 In other words, the global dimension 
of the internet and, consequently, of the risks it entails 
for digital society at large is comparable to the global 
dimension of other great challenges like climate change, 
mass migration, nuclear power, genetic engineering or 
international terrorism. These risks are somehow inherent 
products of our society, and so are the cyber-risks.3 In 
order to manage them, instruments of the state and 
international cooperation in most cases will not suffice. 
Global solutions are necessary, and one such solution is 
global regulation – global cyber security regulation that is 
democratically decided and globally effective.
Here is my second proposition – perhaps still a bit utopian: 
establishing mechanisms of democratically legitimised 
regulation at the global level as part of a multilayer 
system of governance organised in accordance with 
“multilevel constitutionalism”. Some thoughts on this will 
be presented in Part II of this paper.
I.  Risk Society and the Digital 
Constellation
There is a correlation between the problem as I see it and 
the solution I envisage: With the progressive use of the 
internet, the risk society has assumed a new character 
and proportions with new, so far unknown risks; this is 
the problem. On the other hand, modern information 
technologies and, in particular, the internet are opening 
up new possibilities for managing the risks we are facing; 
this is the solution. A first question is this: with regard to 
the risks that are accompanying the digital revolution, 
what kinds of risk exactly are making the risk society in 
the digital age different from the risk society of the kind 
 2.  Pernice (2016, pp. 151-206; 2017, pp. 27-52; forthcoming).
 3.  See already Pernice (2017, note 2, p. 5).
 4.  Beck (1986, pp. 17-18, 25-30, 48, 52-58).
 5.  Ibid., p. 26. 
 6.  Beck (1999, 2008) and particularly pp. 40-42, where he emphasises the “cosmopolitan momentum” of the world risk society; and Beck 
(2009, pp. 3-22).
 7.  Ibid., pp. 29-30, 36, 42-43.
described by Ulrich Beck? It appears that the (world) risk 
society described by Ulrich Beck (infra 1) corresponds 
in many respects to the “postnational constellation” 
of Jürgen Habermas in that it faces the challenges of 
globalisation and is compelled by a need to rethink 
democracy (infra 2). However, an answer to the open 
question of how to organise democracy beyond the state 
at the global level seems to be possible as a result of the 
opportunities presented by the digital revolution only. 
Besides its concomitant new risks, therefore, digitisation 
is also fundamentally changing the conditions for political 
processes in such a way that it is fair to conceptualise 
the new situation as the “digital constellation” (infra 3). 
Thus, with the internet it seems to be possible to develop 
an answer. And yet only the new risks and opportunities 
presented by digitisation and the internet seem to compel 
us – but also allow us – to conceptualise and establish a 
system of democratic norm-setting as required under the 
new circumstances (infra 4). 
1.  Risk Society and World Risk 
Society (Ulrich Beck)
We owe the term “risk society” to Ulrich Beck’s works on the 
society of the 1980s, which presented new risks of a kind 
and magnitude hitherto unknown and equally affecting all 
members of society.4 In contrast to the industrial society 
described by Marx and Weber, the question is not how 
best to utilise nature, to release men from traditional 
constraints and to produce and redistribute wealth in a 
society of inequalities. The risk society has to deal with 
problems arising from socio-economic development, the 
risks produced by industrialisation and new technologies: 
nuclear accidents, genetic engineering, climate change, 
air pollution and the dying forests, to name but a few. 
These risks are man-made, and they are transnational, in 
part global.5 This is why Beck extended his concept of risk 
society to “World Risk Society”.6 The risks are unintended 
and “implicit” side-effects of industrialisation, “risks of 
modernisation”; they are universal and affect the poor as 
much as the rich, they are “self-referential”, unpredictable 
and difficult to attribute to particular individuals.7 And 
they produce inequalities at all levels, including the 
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international one.8 Ulrich Beck distinguishes these risks 
from personal risks, such as those taken by Columbus when 
discovering new continents and having the connotation of 
adventure and courage. Instead, the new risks are general, 
they have the potential to cause mankind to destroy itself.9 
Also, “external” risks like natural disasters or pandemics, 
unforeseeable and unattributable to anyone as they are, 
are not the kind of risks that Beck is referring to in his 
concept of risk society.10
Cyber-risks are of a different kind as well. They can be very 
explicit, concrete and visible. Cyber-threats, as experienced, 
affect individuals, business, public services and authorities, 
critical infrastructures, energy grids, nuclear plants, and 
whatever is connected to the internet11 or depends on its 
operation. These threats are not unintended, general and 
implicit but intended and focused. Cyber-risks can have a 
global dimension, like the risks Ulrich Beck is concerned 
with. Cyber-threats, however, are not from diffuse sources, 
as in the case of air pollution or dying forests, but always 
arise from a well-determined source, often individuals, but 
also from groups, businesses or states. As attribution is 
not technically possible; for the potential victims they give 
the appearance of natural disasters. However, they are not 
“external” to the society, but “internal”. They are “risks 
of modernisation” like the risks described by Ulrich Beck. 
In contrast to those, however, they arise from intentional 
planned attacks on IT systems, starting with smartphones 
and individual computers up to critical infrastructures. In 
this respect, cyber-risks are distinct from risks qualified 
as unintended side-effects, if they are not the unintended 
side-effects of digitisation at large. 
Interestingly, in his book on the “World Risk Society”, 
Beck places particular emphasis on the global dimension 
of the new risks: “they destroy national borders and 
mix the domestic with the foreign”.12 With regard to the 
environment, he observes a de-coupling of the social 
 8.  Ibid., pp. 54-58.
 9.  Ibid., p. 28.
 10.  Ibid., p. 300, where he emphasises that an essential characteristic of the risk society is the fact that we cannot make external factors 
accountable for the risk situations (“Unmöglichkeit externer Zurechenbarkeit von Gefahrenlagen”).
 11.  Stuxnet is said to be a case where the attack was possible even when there was no connection to the internet, see: Kushner (2013).
 12.  Beck (1999, note 6, p. 40), mentioning the “cosmopolitical moment” as an indication for a “meta-change” of the society of the 21st 
century: ibid., p. 41 (my translation). See also ibid., pp. 287-91.
 13.  Ibid., p. 288.
 14.  Ibid., p. 288-89.
 15.  Ibid., p. 291.
 16.  Ibid., p. 322-23. For his understanding of the term “cosmopolitan” see also ibid., p. 314.
 17.  Ibid., p. 326.
 18.  Ibid., p. 339-40; in English: Ulrich Beck, Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision, in: 16 Constellations (2009, 
p. 5).
location of the responsible decision-maker from the 
place and time where foreign people become the object 
of the physical and social injury the decisions cause.13 
The complexity of the interaction and accumulation of 
disorders and destructions, he concludes, are challenging 
the survival of the planet itself, while international risk 
management is becoming progressively necessary and 
influential.14 Cyber-risks may not be challenging the 
survival of the planet, but they do stretch across borders 
and continents because of the global reach of the internet 
itself.
With regard to civil society, Beck detects approaches 
supporting a “world-risk-civic right”. In a new social 
theory, he states, society must be de-coupled from the 
state. What he strives to sketch out is a historico-empirical 
social theory of the world-risk-society.15 Beck also takes a 
cosmopolitan view of sociology, based upon the insight 
that reality is no longer national or international, but 
borderless and global: decision-makers have to take 
account of the people their decisions potentially affect, 
wherever they are in the world.16 He shares the call made 
by David Held for the establishment of institutions for 
global coordination, while emphasising that, prior to 
institutionalisation, global norms are emerging merely 
from the general indignation felt about facts that are 
considered to be simply unacceptable: norms, he says, do 
not only emerge “positively” from legislative processes 
but also “negatively” from an evaluation of crisis and 
threats.17 But he goes one step further. The ethical 
principle of hospitality in the sense meant by Immanuel 
Kant, who regarded the duty to welcome strangers as a 
key feature of his normative cosmopolitanism, for Beck 
would not be applicable in what he calls “the global 
space or responsibility of global risks”.18 The category 
of hospitability would not be “appropriate to expressing 
the inescapability of moral proximity over geographical 
distance”. For Beck, the global risks trigger a kind of 
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“compulsory cosmopolitanism” instead, “in a world whose 
boundaries are as porous as Swiss cheese, at least as 
regards communication and economics”.19 The global 
risks create a “globalised neighbourhood” among people 
worldwide, though unequally because of the different 
vulnerabilities in different regions of the world. “In legal 
terms” he says, “the ethical principle of recognition involves 
a kind of cosmopolitan law of global risk”. It is “the ‘living 
side effects’ of the risk decisions of others”, in his view, 
that create the right to have a say in these decisions.20 
These are the external effects of national policies in an 
interconnected world, and many of the global risks analysed 
by Beck are the result. This leads to the normative claim: 
Global risks produce harms that transcend national 
borders. Thus the cosmopolitan law of risk is possible only 
if the boundaries of moral and political communities can be 
redefined so that the others, strangers and outsiders, are 
included in the key decisions which jeopardise and violate 
their existence and dignity.21 
Consequently, for him, the future of politics is cooperation: 
“no nation can master its problems alone”. Beck calls 
this “an insight of political realism”, and he qualifies it 
as the “fundamental law of cosmopolitan Real politik”.22 
As will be shown below, all this applies to cyber-risks, the 
management of which requires more than cooperation.
2.  The Postnational Constellation 
(Jürgen Habermas)
Beck’s analysis, after all, draws attention to important 
aspects of globalisation. The risks include environmental, 
economic and terrorist risks. They are distinct from each 
other, and each of them requires different responses.23 
He insists, however, that they have two key features in 
common: “First, they all promote or dictate a policy of 
proactive countermeasures that annuls the basis of the 
 19.  Ibid., p. 4.
 20.  Ibid., p. 6.
 21.  Loc. cit.
 22.  Ibid., p. 18.
 23.  Ibid., p. 13-15.
 24.  Ibid., p. 15.
 25.  Habermas (2001, note 1, pp. 58-112).
 26.  For the construction of democracy beyond the state see already Pernice (1999, pp. 703-9); see also, with a comprehensive analysis, 
Peters (2001, pp. 93-166). 
 27.  Ibid., p. 60.
 28.  Ibid., p. 60-61.
existing forms and alliances of international politics, 
necessitates corresponding redefinitions and reforms 
and calls forth new political philosophies”. Second, they 
cannot be understood as “external”, but are “the risks of 
civilisation”, as Beck says, that “may give rise to a more 
acute global normative awareness, create a public space 
and perhaps even a cosmopolitan outlook”.24
a. Democracy theory revisited 
At this point, though from a different perspective, the 
analysis corresponds not only to the cosmopolitan 
approach of David Held but also to the “postnational 
constellation” of Jürgen Habermas. Habermas, too, paves 
the way towards a revisited and extended approach to 
democracy as a democratic necessity.25 His concept not 
only offers an opening-up of democracy theory,26 but also 
indicates a number of fundamental points for democratic 
risk management at the global level. In contrast to the 
“historical constellation” that has existed since Rousseau 
and Kant, in which the democratic process assumed the 
more or less convincing institutional form of the territorial 
state or the nation, faced with the effects of globalisation,27 
Habermas looks for “appropriate forms for the democratic 
process to take beyond the nation-state”. There is what he 
calls a “paradoxical situation”, described as follows:
The idea that one part of a democratic society is capable 
of a reflexive intervention into society as a whole has, until 
now, been realised only in the context of nation-states. Today, 
developments summarised under the term ‘globalization’ 
have put this entire constellation into question.28 
Democracy organised within nation-states is limited 
to the borders of each state: The state is regarded as 
the home of sovereignty. The self-determination of the 
“sovereign” people cannot reach beyond these borders, 
except for international cooperation or war. The former is 
ineffective, the latter unacceptable. Though the external 
effects of national politics have always existed in history, 
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the world has changed with the progress of globalisation. 
With a reference to Claus Offe David Held stated in 1992 
that “national communities by no means exclusively make 
and determine decisions and policies for themselves, and 
governments by no means determine what is appropriate 
exclusively for their own citizens”.29 On the basis of 
this observation he argued that traditional concepts of 
democracy have to be rethought and to this end “a new 
agenda will have been created for democratic theory and 
practice”.30 As he demonstrates, the interdependence 
and interconnectedness of states, the external effects of 
national political decisions on other countries and the 
need for instruments for effective joint decision-making at 
the global level on common problems exceeding the reach 
of national politics have notably increased; hence his call 
for “cosmopolitan democratic law”31 in a “cosmopolitan 
democracy”.32 In the same vein, in “The Postnational 
Constellation” (2001) Habermas envisages that politics in 
future will become a substantial part of “world domestic 
politics” implemented in the name of, for and by the 
“citizens of the world”.33 
Whether the responsible political leaders of the world 
have learned from these analyses or not, we still have 
no appropriate institutional settings for exercising 
democracy beyond the state at the global level. Would 
their establishment be a threat to the democracy of the 
nation-state? In his book on the crisis of the European 
Union, taking the EU as a model for his propositions on 
the establishment of a global regulatory capacity to meet 
global challenges, Habermas argues that establishing 
institutions and processes for regulation at the global 
level would not be at odds with democracy, but in fact the 
opposite: it is a requirement of democracy: 
In view of a politically unregulated growth in the complexity 
of the world society which is placing increasingly narrow 
systemic restrictions on the scope for addition of nation 
states, the requirement to extend political decision-making 
 29.  Held (1995, p. 17), quoting Offe (1985, pp. 286) who explains this ibid., p. 283-4, with regard to the nation state.
 30.  Held (1995, pp. 16-23); see also Beck (note 4, p. 310), as an aspect of politics losing boundaries (“Entgrenzung von Politik”, ibid., 
p. 300).
 31.  Held (1995, note 30, p. 31, 239-266), based upon a brilliant description of five “disjunctures” of the modern society, ibid. p. 99-140. 
 32.  Ibid., p. 267-286.
 33.  See Habermas (2001, note 1, p. 104-112): “make a change of course toward a world domestic policy possible without a world 
government”.
 34.  Habermas (2012, p. 15); see also ibid., p. 55.
 35.  Ibid., p. 2, p. 53-70.
 36.  Habermas (2001, p. 69-76).
 37.  Habermas, (2012, p. 55).
 38.  Ibid., p. 60-66.
 39.  Ibid., p. 56.
capabilities beyond national borders follows from the 
normative meaning of democracy itself.34
In some way, the EU can indeed be taken as a model 
for a democratic constitution of such decision-making 
capabilities. Habermas develops some important thoughts 
on a politically constituted world society and on designing 
institutions and processes along these lines at the global 
level.35 Globalisation, interconnectedness, environmental 
imbalances, the external costs of national politics and 
the economic crisis, as described in the emerging world 
society with all its complexities, are taken as a challenge 
to the traditional, nation-state-related democratic system. 
The incapacity of the nation-state to fully meet its original 
tasks of providing peace and security in a broad sense, 
particularly through an effective risk management in 
the postnational constellation, has placed even the self-
determination of people at risk. Whatever democratic 
processes the internal constitutional system may look like, 
as a consequence of globalisation the classic nation-state 
has an increasingly growing democratic deficit.36 This 
deficit needs to be repaired through an extension of the 
concept and practice of democracy.
b. “The Political Constitution of World Society”
Though not a purely intellectual construction, “social 
reality” is itself imposing a “shift in perspective from 
classical international law to the political constitution 
of world society”. Habermas, therefore, argues that 
“environmental imbalances and the risks generated 
by large-scale technology have given rise to a similar 
global need for regulation”.37 The constitutional solution 
proposed for the “postnational constellation” is to extend 
democracy beyond national borders with a central role for 
the (reformed) United Nations and a representation of the 
world’s citizens through an elected global parliament.38 
The United Nations “should be reorganised as a politically 
constituted community of states and citizens”.39 With 
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regard to the problems of legitimation at this level, 
though, Habermas envisages a split between two areas 
of competence: tasks of global security, the prohibition of 
violence and human rights protection have to be decided 
by the “world organisation”, while “tasks of world domestic 
politics with distributive implications are not included in the 
hierarchically constructed arrangement of competences”; 
they must be “negotiated transnationally”.40 The world 
parliament, composed of representatives of the world’s 
citizens and states would have a general deliberative 
function and would, in particular, “ensure that the 
competing justice perspectives of world citizens, on 
the one hand, and of national citizens, on the other, 
would be taken into account and brought into balance”.41
Many challenges of globalisation, however, and the 
global risks dealt with by Ulrich Beck and recognised 
by Habermas, as well as the new cyber-risks, would not 
be manageable with such an arrangement. These are 
basically questions of world domestic politics in need of 
globally applicable and enforceable regulation which, 
owing to its limited legitimacy and representation of the 
world’s citizens, the UN as an institution, even together 
with a world parliament, is unable to ensure. 
3.  Conceptualising the “Digital 
Constellation”
Digitisation not only entails new challenges and risks but 
also involves a far more important change that is essential 
for what could be called the “digital constellation”. This 
change is about organising legitimacy, beyond what 
Habermas has already assumed when proposing to extend 
the chain of legitimacy to the “world organisation”:
that the global, in part digitally produced, communication 
processes extend beyond porous national public spheres 
in such a way as to enable all peoples to form a reasoned 
judgment about the moral core content of decisions taken at 
the UN level.42
There are three major changes to observe that characterise 
the new constellation that can be called the “digital 
constellation” and, thus, one step beyond Habermas’ 
 40.  Ibid., p. 67-68.
 41.  Ibid., p. 58-59.
 42.  Ibid., p. 66.
 43.  Held (1995, p. 122).
 44.  Ibid., p. 123.
postnational constellation: A new communicative density 
of the global society (infra a), new opportunities for 
democratic processes (infra b), which could allow the 
development of global responses to the new risks of 
digitisation (infra c).
a. A New Communicative Density  
of the Global Society
The new information and communication technologies do 
more than change markets into e-markets, allow financial 
transactions globally at lightning speed and on a massive 
scale, and change industrial processes, labour markets as 
well as administrative structures and processes. Overall, 
they are pushing society into a new constellation, with a 
new kind of density of social and communicative relations, 
and with a so far unknown proximity between people from 
all over the globe. 
The “globalizing impact of the modern communications 
media” has been described by David Held as “part of a 
process of ‘cultural globalization’”; it is one of the five 
disjunctures he has determined.43 He observes that 
“the development of the new communication systems 
creates a world in which the particularities of place and 
individuality are constantly mediated by regional and 
global communication networks”, with the effect that 
“the traditional link between ‘physical setting’ and ‘social 
situation’ is broken”.44
Held could not foresee the dramatic developments of the 
internet, which not only confirms his observation but also 
carries it to a new dimension. Today, the internet reaches 
all points of the globe, we get news from everywhere, 
not filtered through established media only, but directly 
from people of other continents, in real time. So we can 
communicate our ideas, opinions, actively participate in 
public debates and influence political processes, wherever 
we like. In the “global village” we can observe and have a 
greater sense than we could in the past of how politics and 
actions at one place in the world potentially affect people 
at other places around the globe. The internet allows us 
even to have a direct personal voice in politics abroad, in 
real time – and not through diplomatic channels only. 
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b. A New Infrastructure for a Global Digital 
Democracy
With the internet, we can observe the emergence of a 
new potential for open, deliberative democracy also at 
the global level: Borderless, real-time communication and 
information; access to knowledge and education regardless 
of geographical distances; social networks, discussion 
platforms and deliberative spaces across borders and 
continents etc. are allowing the emergence of a global 
public sphere, which is one of the conditions of global 
democracy. With the new dimension of proximity, social 
interrelation and discourse among people worldwide, 
opportunities for democratic rule-making at the global 
level are thus visible and they need further consideration.45 
The distinction between “them” and “us” is fading away, 
like the other distinctions Ulrich Beck says have already 
disappeared in the world risk society.46 Human dignity and 
solidarity are felt more and more to apply across borders 
and continents too, and the emergence of global norms 
arising from the indignation about crises and disasters in 
other parts of the world, described by Beck,47 is increasing.
The term “digital constellation”, therefore, corresponds 
to the digital society, which is global like the risk society. 
It reflects a level of social and communicative relations 
among people that is comparable to those at the local, 
regional, national and supranational levels of society, 
though still more informal and with less attachment. Its 
potentials, however, include the formation of a global 
political will across continents, as is already practiced in 
the areas of internet governance and as can be further 
developed as a fundamental part of a global order 
that is capable of meeting global challenges through 
democratically established rules and concepts.48 Among 
these challenges are the new risks that need to be 
managed at all levels, and for which regulation is required 
also at the global level: One example is cyber-security.
 45.  Pernice (2016).
 46.  Beck (1999, p. 335-36).
 47.  See supra n 16.
 48.  For the theoretical concept and a model of global regulation along these lines see Pernice (2016). 
 49.  See the study by the Swedish Minister of Defence (1976).
 50.  Precious insights into the issue and methodology are provided by Finneran Dennedy, Fox and Finneran (2014).
 51.  For the history see Burkeman (2009).
 52.  For an analysis based upon the RFC’s of 10 years’ previous development see Braman (2011).
 53.  For one of the most striking examples, see the 2001 Report (Gerhard Schmid) of the European Parliament, on the existence of a global 
system for the interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system) of the ‘Five Eyes’, running since 
the 1960s until its discovery in 1990 at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-
2001-0264+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> [Accessed: 12/08/17]. Today, based upon a comparative analysis, Richard Morgan recommends 
the ‘Five Eyes’ model as an international norm for intelligence oversight: Goldman and  Rascoff (eds) (2016).
 54.  For a comparative analysis see: Goldman and Rascoff (eds) (2016).
c. New Risks and Challenges
The risks attending the use of computers and the 
progressive digitisation of our societies were observed 
early on,49 but with the changing context and spread 
of the technologies the proportions they assume are 
somewhat unexpected and surprising. New products and 
applications are often put on the market without sufficient 
care being taken over security. The producers need to 
learn that a sound security and privacy engineering50 is 
part of the deal. The internet grew out of efforts in military 
and academic circles to allow computers to connect and 
to ensure safe communication within the army or easy 
communication among students. As Oliver Burkeman of 
the Guardian newspaper says in an article commemorating 
forty years of the internet in 2009, “hobbyists” played a 
major role in the early developments of the internet in civil 
contexts, and safety of the net or cyber security was not 
among the concerns leading their work.51 Early warnings 
on privacy issues52 however, and the revelations about 
mass surveillance by intelligence services53 received little 
public attention or had only little impact in real terms on 
enhanced oversight.54 
In the internet’s early stages of development it was difficult 
to foresee the enormous threats we are discussing today 
as a by-product of digitisation. Here are but four issue 
areas that are far from being resolved:
a.  Privacy is one of the major concerns in the public debate 
on the new techniques of data collection, storage, 
transfer and processing, including big data analysis and 
profiling. Human dignity and personal rights are also 
threatened by hacking-attacks on private computers, 
e-mailing systems or databases. Last but not least, 
individual surveillance by law enforcement authorities 
and mass surveillance by intelligence agencies, as known 
from the Snowden revelations in 2013, have been made 
possible in the age of digitisation and have reached an 
Eloi Puig
IDP no. 26 (February, 2018) I ISSN 1699-8154 Journal promoted by the Law and Political Science Department
Ing lf Pernice
91
www.uoc.edu/idp
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
Risk management in the digital constellation - a constitutional perspective (part I)*
intensity, depth and extent that have changed the very 
nature of intelligence. Espionage among states and 
governments was broadly accepted in the past, but what 
we are seeing now is intelligence activities affecting the 
whole of society. Such systematic threats to privacy 
affect everybody’s private life and human dignity, they 
produce chilling effects on the exercise of fundamental 
rights and freedoms and, in particular, of the freedom 
of expression. They can, at least indirectly, even harm 
democratic processes. 
b.  Democratic processes, including elections and 
democracy at large, are also threatened by other 
kinds of cyber-attack, such as massive disinformation 
campaigns through fake news in social media, botnets 
and systematic manipulation of people on the basis of 
individualised profiles and psychographic targeting. The 
case of Cambridge Analytica is a striking example.55 
Such threats may come from inside a country, but 
equally from abroad, as in the case of the alleged 
Russian activities in the latest American election 
campaign. Hate speech, xenophobia, extremist and 
populist postings in social media risk poisoning political 
discourse and culture in western democracies. As it is 
not possible to determine with certainty the origins 
of these actions, the platforms and intermediaries are 
made responsible. Compelling internet platforms to take 
down illegal content, as the German legislator is doing 
with the new “Netzdurchsetzungsgesetz”, however, 
is only a very partial and limited solution, which itself 
raises many questions.56 
c.  Security, from the personal computer or smartphone 
up to nuclear power plants, traffic systems or the entire 
energy grid, is under increasing threat from private or 
state hacking or cyber attacks. 284,000 cyber attacks 
against its IT equipment were registered by the German 
Ministry of Defence within the first nine weeks of 2017 
alone. The yearly damage in Germany is estimated to 
cost 50 billion euros per year. But more importantly, 
in the case of the crash of a nuclear plant or the 
breakdown of the energy supply system, the damage can 
 55.  For an account of the method see: Grassegger and Krogerus (2016); for attempts by Cambridge Analytica to calm down the discussion, 
see Beuth (2017).
 56.  See also the critical remarks of Donahoe (2017). See also Scott and Cerulus (2017). 
 57.  See Hay Newman (2017); Steger (2017); Solon and Hern (2017).
 58.  See also Leuschner (forthcoming).
be unimaginable – not to mention the damage caused 
by cyber war, given the new capacities established in 
many countries, including Germany, not only for cyber-
defence troops but also with offensive cyber-weapons. 
New incidents like WannaCry and NotPetya hitting 
thousands of internationally active companies and even 
public hospitals are but the latest of the publicly visible 
cyber attacks rolling around the globe.57
The digital revolution with its power, spread and intensity, 
including the new threats as we are experiencing them 
today, has changed public awareness of the risks and the 
need for action. As we can see, all the values at stake, as 
listed above, are closely linked with fundamental rights 
or principles, including cyber-security.58 As the risks we 
are facing in the digital society are not external, from 
outside like a thunderstorm, but self-made risks produced 
by society itself, it is our joint social responsibility to find 
appropriate ways of managing them. 
National legislation can strive to limit these risks, 
but threats from sources outside the country, even if 
detected, are difficult to counter. The country of origin 
may have different laws and allow the activities that 
create the threats, and in any event, sanctions cannot be 
imposed on other countries. Attacks ranging from those 
on the dignity of the person and privacy to the integrity of 
information systems, private property or the democratic 
system and the whole of society at large can vary in scope 
and gravity. The internet allows attacks across borders 
from any place in the world, striking targets in any other 
part of the world. Even if one knew where the attack had 
originated, the law of the country struck by it would not 
be applicable to an attacker situated abroad. The rules on 
state responsibility under international law are difficult to 
enforce. The risks characterising the digital constellation 
cannot be managed with the traditional toolbox of 
national politics. Along with the progressively creative 
and universal application of the internet, creative and 
universal strategies for risk management in the digital 
constellation are needed.
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